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Infonex and Anonymizer				9/9/97
For Immediate Release
Contact:	Mark Hedges			Infonex Internet Inc.
		(619) 667-7969 (ph)		Anonymizer Inc.
		(619) 667-7966 (fx)		8415 La Mesa Blvd. Ste. 3
		hedges@infonex.com		La Mesa, CA  91941, USA
INFONEX AND ANONYMIZER OPPOSE FBI ENCRYPTION RESTRICTIONS
AND SUPPORT FREE ENCRYPTION EXPORT
On September 4th, 1997, FBI Director Louis Freeh sat before a Judiciary
subcommittee and called for "a feature ... that will allow law enforcement
to have an immediate lawful decryption of the communications in transit or
the stored data.  That could be done in a mandatory manner.  It could be
done in an involuntary manner." The following day, California State
Legislature unanimously passed a resolution calling on the United States
Congress and President Clinton to revise and relax cryptographic export
policies.
We strongly oppose Freeh's call for FBI access to all financial,
interpersonal, and private communications. His proposal is a dangerous,
insecure, and anti-competitive policy. Freeh is an appointed bureaucrat,
not an elected representative. His role is to implement the will of the
Congress, and ultimately, the voters. It is highly inappropriate for him
to dictate policy to them. It is especially disturbing given the
overwhelming public opposition to restrictions on cryptography. The
unanimous vote of the California Legislature is just one example of the
bipartisan and nearly universal opposition to restrictions on cryptography
by both the public and business. 
Freeh calls for a law that would directly violate the President's vow to
never regulate domestic encryption. Freeh's proposed regulations would
clearly violate the first and fourth amendments. The ability to decrypt
communications in real time, combined with the ease of transparent
universal monitoring on the Internet, makes a potent, invasive
combination. 
"Key escrow" and other cryptographic "back doors" are very dangerous. 
Even high security military computers have been cracked by amateur
hackers. With all cryptographic keys concentrated in one place, there is a
single target for attackers. While a single key will only unlock a tiny
fraction of all transactions, the whole key archive could be worth
trillions to a criminal. "This trillion dollar prize would fit on a small
cartridge slipped in a worker's pocket." stated Lance Cottrell, President
of Anonymizer Incorporated. "Is it realistic to expect all the people
working in the key escrow facility will resist multi-million dollar
bribes? Remember the CIA branch chief and Soviet spy Aldrich Ames. All the
technical security in the world will not stop a corrupt administrator." 
Import and export of cryptography is trivial. All the significant
cryptographic software in existence would fit on a single DAT tape smaller
than a standard audio tape. In reality, most U.S. strong encryption
software is exported illegally over the Internet and available on European
servers within 48 hours of its domestic release. 
While criminals will take advantage of the weak cryptography, proposed by
Freeh, to break in to "secure" systems, they will not use it themselves.
"A good book on cryptography," says Mr. Cottrell, "is exportable and
protected by the First Amendment. With such a book, anyone can write
unbreakable encryption programs. Many companies have already moved their
security software development offshore. Europe, China, and Russia are
becoming the cryptography capitals of the world." Businesses in other
nations already successfully sell strong encryption products. In the
future, almost all software will incorporate secure cryptography. The
world market for computer software is strong and growing. "If Freeh's
proposed legislation is passed, we and most other software companies will
be forced to move abroad or loose to foreign competitors." 
Copyright 1997 Infonex Internet Inc. Published with expressed permission.